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FOREWORD 
Throughout its history the Religious Society of Friends has 
emphasized the importance of the right ordering of the inward per- 
sonal life. The central feature of the "inward way" is believed to be 
man's relationship to God. Out of this spiritual junction flow the 
currents which shape the ordered personal life and which nurture 
right relationships with others. 
But Quakers have also sought to keep sensitive to the manner in 
which institutions and governments have imposed patterns inhibit- 
ing the development of the spiritually centered life. Sometimes by 
themselves, but more often in association with others, Friends have 
attempted to improve the social and political environment. These 
efforts of individual Quakers, and at times of the full Religious So- 
ciety, have occasionally brought Friends in opposition to the govern- 
ment under which they lived. These experiences have often led 
Friends to make suggestions for improving governmental or inter- 
governmental machinery. 
The issues of war and peace have now become so engrossing, 
and these questions have merged so fully into problems of govern- 
mental policy and international organization, that a present-day 
Quaker concern in this area needs no special apology. 
William Penn in his "Essay Towards the Present and Future 
Peace of Europe . . ." suggested that "peace is maintained by justice, 
which is a fruit of government . . ." In discussing the establishment 
of a government for Europe, he considered problems of weighted 
representation, methods of voting, and the type of housing and archi- 
tectural design that would facilitate the conduct of inter-governmen- 
tal business. He believed that international war was a scourge which 
could be eliminated only by international organization. 
Many of the questions with which William Penn wrestled are 
still unsolved. But today they appear against a grimmer backdrop. 
The compulsion to seek and find solutions now draws on a deep 
foreboding. that the issues are nothing less than those of human 
survival. 
Ever since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, Quakers 
have been actively interested in it. Official observers in New York, 
Geneva, and Paris, appointed by the Friends World Committee for 
Consultation, have kept in touch with various aspects of the U.N. 
and its Specialized Agencies. In world-wide practical service the 
American Friends Servick c o h n ' e i  frequently has found itself 4 
working in close relation with the United Nations, helping Arab, , 
German, and Korean refugees, or meeting other needs of body and 
spirit in cooperation with UNRRA, UNICEF, and other U.N. 
agencies. . 
The United Nations has already figured in previous AFSC 
studies-The United States and the Soviet Union (1949), Steps to 
1 
Peace (1952), and Toward Security Through Disarmament (1952). 
Another study published in 1955, Speak T r d  to Power, instead of 
proposing specific next steps to reduce tension, explores some general 
alternatives to violence in international conflict. 
This present study has been prepared largely by members of the 
Quaker staff at the United Nations in New York and of the Quaker 
International Center in Geneva. Background studies were first pre- 
pared dealing with three aspects of U.N.'s work with which Friends 
have had cansiderabli experience: economic and social &airs, the 
peaceful settlement of, disputes, and disarmament. At an early stage 
these papers were reviewed by panels nominated by the Regional 
Offices of the American Friends Suvice Committee in the United 
States. The general analysis and the conclusions grow out of these 
background studies.'~he studies themselves have been included for 
the benefit of those readers who would like to go more deeply into 
&e issues involved. 
Like the preceding reports, this one has been approved for pub- 
lication. by the AFSC Executive Board, not as an 0~cia1'~ronounce- 
ment, but in the interest of stimulating public discussion of the issues 
raised, and in the hope that such discussion will contribute to the 
formation of policies that will bring peace. - 
No proposals for improvement in evernmental or inter-govern- 
mental machinery, even if accepted, will by themselves bring the 
world to the external peace it seeks. Peace is a spiritual condition 
which reflects man's relationship both to God and to his fellow men. 
But suggestions such as we have madej might, if accepted, be useful 
in lightening man's burden and aiding his search for the road to 
peace. It is in this spirit that the proposals are offered. 
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"There are two ways by which mankind has sought a good and 
satisfying life. The first requires a change in the world around us; the 
second, a change within ourselves. By the firs# we attnnpt to order 
our environment so that it biil satisfy our desires; by the second we 
lrttempt to order our inner life so. that happiness and satisfaction are 
attPinkd independently of the outer world?. 
-Howard Brinton 
- 'Wh& Two Ways Meet," Critique By Eternity, 
Pendle Hill, 1943. 
HOW CAN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS BE INCREASED? 
The United Nations has now ended its first decade of existence 
and a time of stock-taking approaches. The representatives at San 
Francisco in 1945 realized that they were not creating a perfect instru- 
ment and provided that in its Tenth Session the General Assembly 
should at least consider whether or not to call a conference to review 
the Charter in the light of experience. Thus, in 1955 the United 
Nations faces this problem. 
There is now much discussion of a Review Conference. The 
United States has indicated that it favors calling such a conference. 
A number of other states including several of the leading European 
countries are known to be doubtful. The U.S.S.R. has thus far ex- 
pressed opposition. Since a majority vote of the members of the 
Tenth General Assembly, or a two-thirds vote of any subsequent 
General Assembly, supplemented by the vote of any seven members 
of the Security Council, will be sufficient to call the conference, there 
is at least a good possibility that it will be held. 
To What Extent Has the 
United Nations Been Successful? 
Much of the present interest in Charter review stems from the 
fact that not all the original hopes for the U.N. have been realized, 
and it is natural to ask whether this is due to defects in the Charter. 
First of all, it is necessary to establish the standards by which 
success is to be judged. Probably the best criteria are the purposes for 
which the Organization was avowedly created. The Charter states 
them in Article I. 
1. To maintain international peace and security. 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations. 
3. To help solve international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character and to promote human 
rights and freedoms for all. 
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends. 
What are some of the accomplishments of the U.N. which 
should be recognized in evaluating its success? 
Briefly, it serves as a focus for the aspirations of most peoples of 
the world for the establishment af world order. It provides a meeting 
place-a forum in which nations can be heard. It has survived "cold 
war" tensions for nearly a decade and continues to work toward 
improvement of the lot of underdeveloped peoples. The actions of 
States which administer trust territories (and of States which report 
to the U.N. on their administration of territories whose inhabitants 
are not yet self-governing) are subject to increasing scrutiny by 
world public opinion through an international body. 
In the economic and social area the accomplishments of the 
Specialized Agencies and of the U.N. Technical Assistance Program 
are important-though not so well known as they should be. Levels 
of health and standards of livhg are being improved. Refugees have 
.been given temporary maintenance and in some areas considerable 
progress has been made in their resettlement. - - 
. Further, the U.N. has played an important part in bringing an 
end to fighting in Kashmir, Indonesia, and Palestine. It has con- 
tributed to a political settlement in Indonesia, and to political pacifi- 
cation in Iran, northern Greece, Palestine, and Korea, though it must iy- 
be recognized that in many of these situations permanent solutions F d . - t i  
have not yet been achieved. 
On the other hand, assured world peace seems far in the future, 
with war still a distinct threat. ~ffectfvi tooperation among nations 
is incomplete. Members have not iived up 'td their pledges,' for exam- 
. ple, to reject war as a method of settling international disputes. In 
' Palestine, while an uncertain truce has been arranged, it is constantly 
,being broken and little real reconciliation has been achieved. In 
Korea, prolonged war has devastated a. country which is still divided. 
A final example may be drawn from the field of disarmament, where 
nothing can yet be recorded in the way of tangible accomplishment, 
though recent developments appear more promising. 
Thus we see that U.N.'s successes in achieving its first two pur- 
poses have been limited although some accomplishments have been 
recorded. The third purpose has been partially achieved, but even 
here there is much more to do. The fourth purpose has been met in 
so far as the U.N. has succeeded in serving its other purposes. 
While the United Nations has survived the pressures arid the 
strains put upon it, the gravity and the complexity of the problems 
confronting the world have increased. It would appear likely, there- 
fore, that if the United Nations is to prove adequate to the issues 
confronting the world in the next decade, some changes in its struc- 
ture and functioning will need to be made. 
In What Directions Should 
the U.N. Be Encouraged to Develop? 
What changes in structure or functioning would enable the 
United Nations to become a more effective instrument? Interested 
groups and individuals have given a great deal of attention to this 
matter and many proposals have been made. These proposals range 
all the way from those which would remove from the U.N. much. 
of the political power it presently possesses to the very substantial 
changes proposed by the World Federalists, who see a solution to the 
present world problem in the creation of a world federation capable 
of making and enforcing world law. 
This pamphlet will not attempt to examine a wide variety of 
proposals but will take a slightly different approach, dealing with 
three areas in which Friends have traditionally been interested: the 
development of U.N.'s economic and social activities, the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, and disarmament. Three "background" stud- 
ies have been prepared which deal with these subjects. In each case 
we have examined U.N. experience and have suggested changes 
which appear to us to need consideration. 
Some of the suggested improvements merely affect practice or 
procedure, requiring no changes in structure. Some depend upon 
structural or organizational changes, but do not necessarily call for 
changes in the Charter itself. In cases of this sort methods of evolu- 
tionary change might be used. We may find, however, that some 
changes in the Charter would be unavoidable if certain suggestions 
are to be implemented. In these cases it would be necessary to seek 
amendment of the Charter, though this need not be in connection 
with a full Charter Review Conference. Such changes might be 
accomplished through the regular amendment procedure provided 
for in Article 108. 
Before taking up proposals which might suggest the need for 
Charter amendment, let us look at an area of U.N.'s work in which 
evolutionary change has taken place-U.N.'s approach to dependent 
peoples. 
An Example of Evolutionmy Change-The Colonial Field: 
Members of the U.N. who administer territories whose people have 
not yet attained a full measure of self-government declare in the 
Charter that the interests of the inhabitants of such territories are 
paramount, and that they accept as a sacred trust the obligation to 
promote the well-being of the inhabitants. They agree to assist in 
creating free political institutions and to develop self-government. 
This declaration, in contrast with the Trusteeship chapters of the, 
Charter, does not give the U.N. any right to supervise the adminis- ' . 
tration of colonial territories. The only obligation specifically as-.' 
sumed by the colonial powers is "to transmit regularly to the 
Secretary-General [of the United Nations] for information purposes 
. . . statistical and other information of a technical nature relating 
to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories." 
The rising tide of anti-colonialism since the Charter was drafted 
ten years ago has led to an extension of the strict terms of the Charter. 
The General Assembly has set up a committee to examine the in- 
formation transmitted by the colonial powers. Then, by debating this 
committee's reports, the U.N. in fact debates conditions in colonial 
territories. Moreover, the avowed purpose of these debates is not to 
engage in an academic discussion on statistical information trans- 
mitted by colonial powers, but to influence the administration of 
colonies. Finally, although there is no obligation to transmit infor- 
mation on political conditions in colonial territories, it has been im- 
possible in practice to keep political considerations out of the debates. 
In much of this evolution the colonial powers themselves have 
participated, though with reluctance and some reservations. They 
have placed at the disposal of the United Nations information 
broader in character than a restrictive interpretation of the Charter 
would suggest; they have shared in the discussion of colonial con- 
ditions; on occasion they have implemented recommendations of the 
General Assembly, though they would probably say that they have 
only done so when these recommendations have corresponded with 
their existing policies. 
There are different views about the wisdom of the developments 
referred to, but there is no disputing the fact that the developments 
have taken place. Moreover, it is quite possible for further develop 
ments to take place in this field without amendment of the Charter. 
One way this could be achieved would be by voluntary action on 
the part of Member States. A colonial power, for example, could 
decide to transmit political information to the U.N. (as some already 
do) although the Charter contains no specific obligation to do this. 
A colonial power could decide to place some or all of its dependencies 
under the Trusteeship System, thus assuming increased obligations 
to the United Nations. A Member State could decide that part of its 
territory, though not a colony in the accepted sense, is nevertheless 
a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self- 
government and -that therefore there is an obligation to transmit 
information on the territory to the U.N. 
It would also be possible for the U.N. to extend its functions 
without such voluntary action by Member States. The U.N. could 
undertake comparative studies of regions of the world in which there 
are both colonies and sovereign states, to see if there is any experience 
of sovereign states which would be of value to colonial territories, 
and vice versa. ?'he Committee on Information from Non-Self- 
Governing Territories might consider it desirable and within its 
terms of reference, for example, to secure information on measures 
taken in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions not only from 
governments and Specialized Agencies but also from qualified non- 
governmental organizations having consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council. A more extensive change, which 
might be acceptable through agreement in the Assembly, would be 
to permit non-governmental organizations with special colonial in- 
terest to participate in an expert capacity in the discussions of the 
Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. 
Let us turn now to U.N.'s economic and social activities to see 
if there are desirable changes that would improve the work of the 
Organization and, if so, how these changes should be brought about. - 
Economic and Social Actiuities: The accomplishments during 
the past ten years of the United Nations in this field are very sub 
stantial. The Technical Assistance Program has sought to raise the 
standard of living in some 100 countries and territories. Over 3000 
technical experts have been recruited and an even larger number of 
fellowships granted. Seventy-six governments and the Vatican have 
contributed some $85,000,000 to this program. 
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), financed en- 
tirely by voluntary contributions from governments and private indi- 
viduals, is working currently in over 90 countries and territories in an 
effort to improve the health and welfare of children and their 
mothers. It works closely with the World Health Organization and 
the Food and Agricultural Organization. The Children's Fund is 
said to be reaching now some ZU,000,OOO additional children every 
year through its health centers, i t s  provision of insecticides9 vaccines 
and antibiotics, and its supplying of powdered milk ta combat 
malnutrition. I ) +-- . 
The Specialized Agencies of the United Nations work through 
the expanded program of Technical Assistance. During the year 1954 
alone, they aided governments in 80 countries and territories 
sending experts to the field and giving advanced training to 
300 technicians. 
Our background study suggests that U.N.'s work in this field 
has, reached out into so many areas that a large amount of the time 
of the Economic and Social Council has inevitably been devoted to 
questions of coordination. The Council has already undertaken a 
review of its activities to ske Re its work could be focused more effec- 
tively and if its procedures could be improved. The Secretary-General I 
has also made certain recommendations for the "streamlining" of 
secretariat activities in these areas. The Council has been experiment- 
ing with a plan under which it has held three or four sessions of 
shorter length in a year-though this experience has not been wholly 
successful. 
Three additional problems are of special importance. 
The first relates to the need for- governmental contributions to 
the programs under the supervision of the Council to be projected 
on a basis which will permit more orderly planning. This is a special 
need in the Technical Assistance Programs but the principle applies 
equally to all. 
Secondly, there is a need for governments (and this applies 
especially to the United States) to channel through the United Na- 
tions a greater proportion of the funds they have available for eco- 
nomic development. The U.N. Technical Assistance Program is &- 
cient and well-managed and funds should be available permitting its 
expansion. 
The third problem concerns the tendency, in view of the limited 
representation of the underdeveloped countries in ECOSOC, for 
debates in the Council of special interest to those countries to be 
reproduced later in the Second and Third Committees of the General 
Assembly where these countries have, relatively, a stronger voice. 
This practice detracts from decision-malung m the C;ouncil. Varrous 
proposals have been made for meeting this problem, including sug- 
gestians that- the membership of ECOSOC be increased.-J3ut in .view 
of the .need for the General Assembly to approve many of the basic 
decisions taken in the Council and of the need for establishing priori- 
ties in the Council's work rather than extending it, the suggestion for 
enlarging the Council has not met with general favor. 
If the membership of the Economic and Social Council were to 
be increased, this would require Charter amendment. Otherwise, it 
would appear that the proposals for improvement in the handling of 
U.N. economic and social affairs would not require any Charter 
change. The Council has the power to restrict and set its own agenda, 
to regulate the time and length of its meetings, and to determine the 
types of subordinate organs it establishes. It can also take any action 
which appears desirable to improve its consultative relationships with 
non-governmental organizations. The evolutionary process, supple- 
mented by new supporting action by national governments, is likely 
to prove adequate as the means of developing the economic and 
social functions of the United Nations. . 
The Peaceful Settlement of Di~cptctes: While the United Nations 
has had some success in settling international conflicts, serious limi- 
tations in its work in this field have also been apparent. Some people 
attribute these limitations largely to the conflicts of the "cold war" 
and to the recurring use of the veto in the Security Council. Others 
believe that U.N.'s principal work in the political field should be the 
peaceful settlement of disputes and that this work is handicapped by 
being so closely related in the Charter to the provisions for enforce- 
ment powers. 
. A glance back over the past ten years suggests that the United 
Nations has not done too badly in bringing armed hostilities to an 
end where military action has broken out. The record is not unim- 
pressive in Indonesia, Kashmiry and Palestine. While opinions differ 
as to U.N.'s responsibility for the final truce in Korea, it is cleai that 
resolutions of the General Assembly provided the framework within 
which the ultimate truce terms were agreed upon. The United' Na- 
tions provided the facilities for the conference in Geneva in April 
and May 1954, at which the Inddhina truce was achieved, and for 
the four-power meeting in Julyy 1955. 
The United Nations' record is less clear in the achievement of 
political settlements. Undoubtedly,' the fact that %these have been 
earnestly sought in many conflict areas has either made possible the 
achievement of a truce or has prevented military conflict from again 
breaking out. But it is only in the Indonesian and Iranian conflicts 
that political settlements were finally achieved; and in the case of 
Indonesia, the future of West New Guinea (West Irian) remains a 
matter of dispute. 
To what extent can U.N.'s work in the pacific settlement of 
disputes be improved ? 
In the background study on peaceful settlement it is suggested 
that there is a useful trend in the U.N. toward a more informal (and 
less legislative) approach to conflict settlement. This development 
might be accelerated if more initiative were taken by the Secretary- 
General or by the President of the General Assembly. There might 
be less initial emphasis in the Security Council, or in the General 
Assembly, on passing a resolution. Already we have seen the develop- 
ment in the Security Council of the practice of taking a "consensus 
of views" (Quakers would call it taking "the sense of the meeting") 
instead of always taking a formal vote. The resource of able and 
experienced people available to the Council and Assembly for de- 
tailed negotiations might be increased by reconstituting the Inter- 
national Panel on Inquiry and Conciliation. This is a panel of persons 
nominated by governments with a view to their availability for 
missions of f act-finding .or conciliation. 
None of' these suggestions can take the place of a firm determi- 
nation on the part of governments to make greater use of United 
Nations facilities in the settlement of disputes,-&, if they are a party 
to a conflict, to give the most careful consideration to U.N. proposals 
- - 
for adjustment. But a review of experience does indicate that in these 
areas the means already lie at hand for improving U.N.'s approach. 
Only three of the proposals advanced in the background study 
involve any questions of Charter change. The study suggests that a 
new effort should be made to restrict the use of the veto on matters 
relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes. It also suggests that 
universal membership in U.N. might enhance the organization's 
work. Some people take the position that if the U.S.S.R. and the 
other Permanent Members of the Security Council were willing to - 
agree to any limitations on the use of the veto on questions of 
peaceful settlement, or on questions of membership, it would be 
easier to get agreement to a modification in practice-with the 
Charter provisions remaining intact. These persons point to the 
"understanding" that now exists in the Security Council that an 
abstention on the part of a Permanent Member is not considered as 
a veto.,They suggest that these Members of the Council .might also 
agree, formally or informally, that on the two questions of peaceful 
settlement and membership the unanimity rule would be set aside. 
This would permit the Security Council to act on peaceful settlement 
questions on the vote of any seven Members and would permit new 
Members of the U.N. to be elected by the General Assembly with 
the concurring vote of any seven Members of the Security Council. 
While it is possible that an agreement might be secured under 
which the Security Council could discharge its obligation on memo 
bership questions by a vote of any seven Members, it is much less 
likely that such an agreement could be secured covering all questions 
of peaceful settlement. The U.S.S.R. would likely insist on any 
change so fundamental being reconciled with Article 27, paragraph 
S i n  which the unanimity rule is laid down. Indeed, it is probable 
that the U.S.S.R. would not be willing to consider so basic a change 
without its being linked to some new developments in the security 
field-such as a disarmament agreement. 
The background study further suggests that the wording of 
Article 37 be amended to eliminate the restriction on recommenda- 
tions of terms of settlement to disputes "likely to endanger the main- 
tenance of international peace and security." It points out that the 
freedom to recommend settlement terms is an important power in 
the hands of a negotiating body. 
Our conclusion, therefore, is that United Nations work in the 
peaceful settlement of disputes would be enhanced by three changes. 
Two of these changes might be secured by agreement among the 
Permanent Members of the Security Council to modify the use of 
the veto. It is probable, however, that such an agreement might be 
reached more easily if it were sought in the context of a Review 
Conference where it could be linked with other developments in the 
security field. Whether the-three changes would in fact be easier to 
achieve if they were pursued in the form of Charter amendments 
would probably depend upon whether other security proposals 
would be likely to have the support of the major powers. 
We come thus to the disarmament field without having found 
in U.N.'s economic and social activities the need for changes that 
call for Charter Revision. In U.N.'s work to settle disputes three 
changes ire needed, but whether two of these should be sought 
through amendment would depend upon the other security and 
disarmament proposals being made. 
Disamammt: Disarmament discussions in the United Nations 
have thus far centered around four major problems: 
, 1. Leuels of national amties and military budgets. 
There is agreement that national armies should be reduced, that 
the reductions should be substantial, and that disarmament should 
be in stages. The first move would be a "freezing" or "standstill" in 
armies and weapons as of an agreed date. 
The U.S.S.R. and the Western powers have been in dispute as to 
the levels to which reductions would be made. The U.S.S.R. has 
wanted reductions by one-third. The Western powers have held that 
a plan of this nature, if accompanied by a prohibition of atomic 6 '  j 
weapons, would give Russia with her large land armies a great mili- 1 
tary advantage. The Western powers have wanted reductions to 
levels which would provide a balance of military power without , 
reference to nuclear weapons. As a result of the negotiations in 
London in April and May of 1955, it would appear that the U.S.S.R. 
and the Western powers are now much closer together, and that 
there is general agreement on levels of from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 
men each for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China, and 650,000 men each 
for the United Kingdom and France. 
Both the U.S.S.R. arid the West suggest that these reductions 
should be a prelude to further disarmament to levels considered 
essential for internal security and to meet obligations under the 
united Nations Charter. ' 
2. Weapons of mass destruction. 
It seems to be agreed that the manufacture, possession and use 
of these weapons should be prohibited, although agreement is lack- 
ing on the exact timetable under which the prohibition would be 
put into operation. 
- 3. Inspecden. 
There is agreement that the inspection system would be inter- 
national and permanent and that inspection would be  continuous."^;^,^ 
Violations or suspected violations would be reported to a United 
Nations organ. 
4. ~n f omemcnt.' j,i 
Disagreement ha& continued over the procedure which would 
"d 
follow a report by inspectors that a violation, or suspected.~violation, 
of the disarmament agreement. had taken place. 
, , '  4 L:',,. In ;he background stud j w e  have' suggested that the interna- 
facturing plants and to possible military staging points, and complete 
freedom in reporting to the central inspection authorities. We sug- 
gest the establishment of a Disarmament Authority, which would 
supervise the carrying out of disarmament under the general agree- 
ment or treaty and to which the inspection force would be respon- 
sible. This Authority should operate by majority vote. It should 
have the power to verdy inspection reports, to attempt through its 
regular channels to get compliance or cooperation, to take cases of 
suspected violations to judicial review, and, if all other agreed means 
fail or are inadequate, to report violations or alleged violations of 
the disarmament treaty to the Security Council, to the General As- 
sembly, and to all signatories of the disarmament treaty. 
We have suggested that the problems of inspection, verification 
and compliance lend themselves better to judicial treatment than to 
political treatment. A major effort should therefore be made to get 
the agreement, especially of the Permanent Members of the Security 
Council, to an extension of the international legal system to cover 
enforcement problems. This might necessitate revision of the Stat- 
ute of the present International Court, or it might necessitate estab- 
lishment of a new court which would deal only with disarmament 
problems. 
A development of this kind would call for a very precise spelling 
out of international judicial relationships in the disarmament treaty. 
It would need, for instance, to be quite clear who the juridical 
"parties" were against which the Disarmament Authority could seek 
restraining orders. The need for an equal precision, however, seems 
already to be called for in defining the freedom of movement and 
investigation of the international inspection authorities. Countries 
covered by the disarmament treaty would need either to agree in 
the treaty that the work of the inspection force did not constitute 
interference in their domestic affairs, or an amendment of the domes- 
tic affairs clause in the Charter (Article 2 (7)) would need to be 
made. At the same time that these juridical questions were being 
spelled out in detail in relation to the inspection system, it would 
not seem unreasonable for parallel juridical provisions to be made 
in connection with enforcement provisions. 
While it is impossible at this stage to project the details of a 
politically possible disarmament agreement, it appears most unlikely 
that any agreement could be secured which would completely elim- 
inate the veto in the Security Council on enforcement action against 
any Member State believed to be violating the agreement. We have 
suggested, however, that the Disarmament Authority report both 
to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, where the veto 
does not apply. But more importantly, we have suggested that the 
enforcement system be based first upon an administrative effort to 
get correction and secure compliance, and second upon a judicial 
effort. We believe this method of handling suspected violations 
would be more conducive to settlement. If properly devised, it 
should be adequate for all but major violations. 
CONCLUSIONS ON CHARTER REVIEW 
How Should Further Development 
of the United Nations Be Fostered? 
There appear to be five general approaches to the question of 
U.N. development. These attitudes may be summarized as follows: 
1. The United Nations has already been given too much power. 
What is needed is a return to traditional diplomacy and to a 
reliance on national strength. 
2. The Charter is good enough. What is needed is for the mem- 
bers to live up to it and use it properly. 
3. Changes and improvements in U.N. are needed, but the 
evolutionary process has already brought important changes. 
We should rely on these evolutionary processes, supple- 
mented by "interpretation" of existing Charter provisions. 
4. Changes and improvements are needed. Let us make use of 
evolutionary development and Charter interpretation, but 
also let us seek other changes through the regular amend- 
ment procedure-without taking on the risks which might 
be involved in a full Charter Review Conference. 
5. The changes required in the U.N. Charter are so substantial 
that a Charter Review Conference should be voted by 
the Tenth or by some subsequent Session of the General 
Assembly. 
The first approach reflects a nostalgic desire to turn back the 
clock of history and to ignore the degree to which modern com- 
munications have made the world interdependent. This pamphlet 
suggests that we have little in common with it. 
Nor would it appear that the second approach is adequate to the 
problems with which the U.N. and the world are now faced. Those 
persons who take the second position usually put the emphasis on 
work for a settlement of cold war tensions, rapprochement of the 
major powers, and a re-dedication to the principles of the Charter. 
These things are good. If the Permanent Members of the Security 
Council could be brought to cooperate with one another and to ob- 
serve the existing provisions of the Charter, the risk of war would 
certainly decline. Admonitions to live up to certain parts of the 
Charter are frequently useful and necessary but such advice also 
serves to remind-u.N.-members of other parts of the Charter which 
have become obsolete. Our studies have suggested the desirability of 
evolution and change. Thus any exclusive pursuit of the second ap- 
proach has distinct limitations. 
With regard to the third approach (evolution plus interpreta- 
tion) it has been suggested that in the economic and social field the 
evolutionary approach is likely to be adequate and that in this area 
Charter amendment is not required. We have also considered the 
U.N.'s responsibility for dependent peoples, and have shown how 
development has taken place, and can take place in the future, with- 
out Charter amendment. It could be argued convincingly that the 
evolutionary method is adequate to secure more radical changes in 
this field. Though we have not in fact discussed the question in 
this pamphlet, we do not see the necessity in this area for radical 
changes. 
In the peaceful settlement of disputes, three changes were sug- 
gested which could involve Charter amendment. These were the 
elimination of the veto on the peaceful settlement of disputes and 
on membership, and the elimination of the restriction in Article 37 
on recommending terms of settlement to "disputes likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security." These three 
changes might be brought about &rough the regular amendment 
procedure (Article 108). It was suggested that these amendments 
should be brought into a Charter Review Conference only if new 
developments in the disarmament and security field would appear 
to justify the holding of such a conference. It is possible that in such 
a setting, agreement to restrict the use of the veto and to amend 
Article 37 might be easier to secure. 
The review of the disarmament problem brought no clear con- 
viction that Charter amendments were an indispensable accompani- 
ment to genuine progress. Substantial additional powers for the 
United Nations would need to be spelled out in the disarmament 
treaty. The signatories might agree that the provisions of the treaty 
represented an interpretation of certain sections of the Charter. 
final assessment of the need for Charter change in this area must 
await, however, a more precise knowledge than we now have as to 
the over-all requirements of a disarmament plan. 
Should a Charter Review 
Conference Be Held? 
The real questions appear to be: 
1. Would it be easier to secure any useful Charter changes if 
they were grouped together for consideration in a Review 
Conference ? 
2. Would the political forces (including that of public opinion) 
that would surround the preparation for, and the holding 
of, such a conference be such as to make more likely the 
achievement of our revision goals ? 
3. Would the likelihood of approval for these Charter changes 
by Member States be enhanced by their being linked in such 
a conference with final agreement on a disarmament treaty 
-even if the disarmament plan itself did not require Charter 
revision ? 
If any changes in the Charter are to be made there is much to 
be said for their being agreed upon, and for their being submitted to 
the Member States for ratification, as one inter-related group of 
amendments. However, for this approach to be successful and for it 
to lead to an actual strengthening of the United Nations, it would 
need to be based upon certain favorable conditions, including: 
1. The existence of sufficient world public opinion in favor of 
strengthening the United ~ a t i o i s  and i f  certain specific 
proposals for Charter change to steady the political context 
in which a Review Conference was held. 
2. The willingness of the U.S.S.R. and the other major powers 
at least to give serious consideration to the proposed Charter 
changes. Before they can become effective, charter amend- 
ments require ratification by two-thirds of the Members of 
the United Nations, including the five Permanent Members 
of the Security Council. 
We believe that the further development and strengthening of 
the United Nations must be accompanied by disarmament. If any 
doubt remained, the experience in Korea should have impressed us 
- 
all with the inadequacy and the danger of reliance on a collective 
security system in a world being competitively rearmed. It is, we 
believe, only in the context of world disarmament that world politi- 
cal security can be achieved. We believe that this is becoming in- 
creasingly evident to both the U.S.S.R. and to the West. While we 
believe that disarmament to the levels being considered in the 
present negotiations would represent a tremendous advance, we 
would like to see more substantial goals firmly set. 
We think it likely that even the minor Charter amendments 
suggested in this study would not be accepted in the absence of 
some form of disarmament agreement. We conclude that a pre- 
requisite to a firm General Assembly decision to hold a Charter 
Review Conference must be sufficient progress on disarmament to 
give reasonable assurance that a disarmament agreement could pre- 
cede such a conference-or that final approval of such an agreement 
could be secured at such a conference. 
While a Review Conference can be called by the Tenth Session 
of the General Assembly, by a majority vote and by a vote of any 
seven Members of the Security Council, such a conference can be 
called by any session of the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote 
and by a vote of any seven Members of the Security Council. If, 
therefore, there is any serious question at the Tenth Session as to the 
imminence of a disarmament agreement, it might be wiser to post- 
pone the decision on the holding of the conference until such an 
agreement was more nearly assured. 
If there are good reasons for holding such a conference, the 
difference between a majority vote at the Tenth Session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly for holding it and a two-thirds vote at a later session 
is not likely to be a major hurdle. Indeed we might suggest that a 
two-thirds vote of the Members of the United Nations for the hold- 
ing of a Review Conference would be one important indication that 
it would be a useful and significant occasion. 
THREE BACKGROUND STUDIES 
I11 a-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 
The U.N. Charter recognizes the relation between political 
problems and economic and social conditions; One of the purposes 
of the U.N, stated in the Charter, is to help solve international prob- 
lems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and 
to promote human rights and freedoms for all. The Charter thus 
reflects the belief that economic and social injustice are among the 
most important causes of war and regards peace not as.a period of 
inactive truce but as the energetic pursuit of the common good of all 
mankind. This was not a new ideal discovered for the first time at 
San Francisco. The Covenant of the League of Nations expressed the 
same ideal. In fact, much of the existing machinery of which U.N. 
is justly proud is to be found in embryonic form in the organization 
of the League. On the whole those parts of the U.N. machinery 
which function most effectively are those which inherited the tra- 
dition and experience of the older organization. At the same time it 
has to be recognized that much of the League's work in this field 
was tentative, experimental, and relatively insignificant. 
The greater stress which United Nations places on the economic 
and social aspects of peace-making is exemplified in the existence of 
a special Council on Economic and Social Affairs (ECOSOC). The 
League had no organ corresponding to ECOSOC, and consequently 
its social and economic activities tended to be treated much more as 
side issues than is the case with the U.N. today. ECOSOC consists 
of 18 Member Governments, six elected by the General Assembly 
each year for a three-year term. Though there is no stipulation in the 
Charter as to membership of the Council, in practice the five great 
powers have been permanent members. In addition, the membership 
reflects so far as possible the various interests and the geographic 
spread of the total membership of the U.N. 
The functions and powers of ECOSOC are defined in Articles 62 
to 66 of the Charter. These empower the Council to ". . . make or 
Initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, 
social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and . . . 
make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the Gen- 
eral Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the 
specialized agencies concerned." ECOSOC may also "coordinate the 
activities of the specialized agencies," "take appropriate steps to o b  
tain regular reports from the specialized agencies," and "communi- 
cate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly." 
Finally, ECOSOC "shall perform such functions as fall within its 
competence in connection with the carrying out of recommendations 
of the General Assembly" and may "perform services at the request 
of members of the United Nations and . . . of specialized agencies." 
ECOSOC's field of activity is thus a very wide one and not cov- 
ered simply by summoning the delegates of 18 nations to two sessions 
annually, each lasting from six to eight weeks. As is the case with 
the General Assembly, the committee method has to be adopted to 
get through the agenda. The Council has two committees corre- 
sponding to the main committees of the Assembly and dealing re- 
spectively with economic and social matters. A third committee, the 
Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), has been established to 
supervise the expanded technical assistance program. As with the 
main committees of the Assembly, all of the 18 Members are repre- 
sented on these three ECOSOC committees. 
More continuous study of some of the matters for which the 
Council is responsible is undertaken by the eight Functional Com- 
missions. These Commissions have a membership of 15 or 18 govern- 
ments-not individuals, though in fact governments have wisely 
avoided changing their representative more often than has been a b  
solutely necessary. The Commission on Human Rights, which is 
perhaps the best known of these Functional Commissions, has been 
meeting regularly for several years and has at last produced draft 
covenants for the consideration of the Council and subsequently of 
the General Assembly. The membership of the Commission has of 
course changed as certain governments withdrew at the end of their 
three-year terms, but a core of its members now know one another 
extremely well and can conduct their debates with considerable free- 
dom and informality. The Human Rights Commission has estab- 
lished a Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
the Protection of Minorities. This consists of twelve members who 
serve as individuals and not as representatives of governments. 
ECOSOC has also established three Regional Economic Com- 
missions: for Europe (ECE), for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 
and for Latin America (ECLA). These economic commissions have 
their own staffs and hold annual meetings of Members and Associate 
Members in their respective areas.  heir-headquarters are at Geneva, 
Bangkok, and Santiago de Chile. 
The ten Specialized Agencies* are not so integral a part of the 
ECOSOC structure as are "the various Commissions already referred 
to. ECOSOC, however, is empowered to bring the Specialized Agen- 
cies into relationshiv with the United Nations and to co-ordinate 
A 
their activities. Hitherto co-ordination has been exercised mainly in 
the field of technical assistance, a program in which all the Spe- 
cialized Agencies are concerned. The Technical Assistance Board 
(TAB) provides co-ordination at the executive and administrative 
level and reports to ECOSOC's Technical Assistance Committee. 
Certain other inter-governmental agencies have a special rela- 
tionship to ECOSOC and submit reports to it. Some, such as the 
Permanent Central Opium Board, have a long history going back to 
the days of the League of Nations; others, such as the Children's 
Fund (UNICEF), were established to meet particular circumstances 
and have already acquired a more or less independent existence. 
Article 71 of the Charter empowers the Council to make ar- 
rangements for consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) which are concerned with matters within its competence. 
ECOSOC's Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations ap- 
proves or rejects requests from organizations wishing to enjoy con- 
r. sultative status with the Council. A small number of NGOs have 
the right to address the Council direct if the Council so approves. 
Other organizations, numbering some 250, may present their views 4 to the Council's Committee on NGOs 
* The Specialized Agencies are as follows: 
Iaternational Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) , Rome 
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Paris 
World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), Washington 
International Monetary Fund (FUND), Washington 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Toronto 
Universal Postal Union (UPU) , Berne 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) , Geneva 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Geneva 
Two additional Specialized Agencies are in process of formation: the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization, and the International Trade Organization. 
How ECOSOC Has 
Functioned Hitherto 
From many points of view the annual sessions of the council, 
totaling perhaps 15 weeks in the year, are too short to cope with the 
large and varied agenda. A glance at the list of items discussed at 
Geneva during the 18th Session of the Council will show how varied 
and miscellaneous this agenda can be. Thire were reports from eight 
of the Specialized Agencies and from UNICEF, from three of the 
functional Commissions, and from one regional Economic Commis- 
sion. This might be regarded as routine work and for the most part 
was so treated, but unless a report can be given at least one day's 
consideration it seems hardly worth making. The other items on the 
agenda of the 18th Session ranged from "The World Economic 
Situation" (including the question of full employment, on which 
documentation ran to nearly 1000 pages) to "World Calendar Re- 
form"; from "Technical Assistance" to "Conference on Customs 
Formalities for the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles 
and for Tourism." Clearly the items were not all of equal importance 
and, in fact, the delegates did not so treat them. The items of less 
importance had to have some discussion if at all possible, and their 
inclusion on the agenda of a six-weeks' session contributed to the 
sense of rush and shortage of time which most ECOSOC delegates 
feel. 
Faced with the necessity of getting through its agenda somehow, 
the Council not surprisingly adopts the useful but humble role of a 
post office. Since something must be done about the matters brought 
to its consideration, the easiest thing for the Council to do is to pass 
them on to someone else. Some items, including the World Calendar, 
were sent to Member Nations for comment, but the favorite destina- 
tion is of course the General Assembly. There are several reasons 
why the Council should tend to act as a forwarding agency between 
other U.N. organs and the Assembly. Pressure on the Council to act 
in this way frequently comes from the underdeveloped countries 
who command a much larger voting strength in the Assembly than 
they do in the Council. If they feel that the Council is not giving 
proper attention to their demands for assistance, they have reason to 
hope that in one of the committees of the General Assembly they 
will receive more sympathetic treatment. 
ECOSOC is under another form of pressure to send matters on - 
to the Assembly without wasting too much time upon them. Its 18 
Members are empowered to act on behalf of the U.N., but they 
realize, and are sometimes reminded, that there are 42 other Member 
States who may have views on the matters under discussion. The 
18th Session, for instance, was presented with the draft Covenants 
on Human Rights, the final product of five years' labor by the 
Human Rights Commission. To have debated the substance of these 
Covenants in the course of the session would have been quite im- 
possible and in any case futile, since the Covenants are of importance 
to all U.N. members and even to States which do not yet belong. On 
this matter, therefore, ECOSOC's 18th Session merely discussed the 
wording of the covering letter to accompany the Covenants to the 
Assembly. 
Action of this kind makes the Council appear to be a somewhat 
insignificant center of the complex organization which it is supposed 
to control. It might, in fact, be said that the parts are greater than 
the whole. This is not only true of the Specialized Agencies, which 
have their own constitutions, membership (often larger than the 
membership of U.N.), and budgets; it is also the case with some of 
the subsidiary organs of the Council such as ECE, whose annual 
session is often attended by delegates of higher rank than those 
whom governments normally send to ECOSOC sessions. This is not 
altogether surprising since the ECE session has a limited and clear- 
cut agenda and lasts only two weeks. One may expect a Minister of 
Finance or Trade to attend such a meeting and thus to lend impor- 
tance to the debate. One cannot expect cabinet ministers to attend a 
session, taking six weeks, in which important items are intermingled 
with matters which would never come before a national cabinet. All 
' these factors contribute to the situations described by Mr. Loveday . 
in the following terms: "It [ECOSOC] is, unfortunately for it, both 
the leader and the led, and the best proof that it is not fulfilling the 
role of leader lies in the fact that on the one hand it has constantly 
found its agenda overcharged, and on the other, it is not being used 
for problems of major importance."' 
1 Loveday, A. Suggestions for the Reform of the U.N. Economic and Socia2 Machin-, 
International Organization, August 1953 (40 Mount Vernon St., Boston, Mass.). 
Reform and 
the Future 
Delegates and members of the secretariat who have had long 
experience of ECOSOC are well aware of the Council's shortcom- 
ings. ECOSOC has not proceeded to an immediate reform of the 
World Calendar but it has adjusted its own calendar in the hope of 
making sessions more effective. An attempt is to be made to grade 
items according to their importance and to devote one of the 
ECOSOC sessions to a full debate on a few matters of outstanding 
importance. It is hoped that government delegates of high rank will 
be sent to a session if it is known beforehand that the debates will 
concentrate on major questions (e.g, the world economic situation) 
and will not be interrupted for the consideration of secondary mat- 
ters. If possible this majorj ECOSOC session should be held at a time 
when the rest of the U.N. program is relatively quiet. This would 
enable ECOSOC to enjoy a little more of the limelight. Though this 
would have its dangers, these are probably outweighed by the 
advantages. 
While ECOSOC has been considering reforming its own p r e  
cedure, the U.N. Secretary General has been busy with a protess 
described as "streamlining." It was felt that the activities of the 
U.N. in the social and economic field had become too diffuse and 
that concentration on selected subjects would produce better results. 
These developments are good. We believe that the U.N. as a 
whole will operate more effectively if ECOSOC concentrates on 
important projects. ECOSOC?? role in coordinating the Specialized 
Agencies should continue to be emphasiz<d and should find expres 
sion in its agenda. Governments should be encouraged by NGOs 
and others to take more important policy questions in international 
economic and social affairs to ECOSOC. 
It would be foolish to expect that changes of this kind will bear 
immediate fruit. Greater impetus and clarity of purpose may emerge, 
but it must be remembered that there are limits to the process of 
coordination. Though it is true that the debates in ECOSOC are 
often conducted in an atmosphere of greater harmony than those in 
the General Assembly, it is nevertheless doubtful whether agreement 
will be reached in the immediate future on an over-all U.N. program 
in the economic and social field-and perhaps this is just as well. 
There is little reason to supposeathat even a reformed ECOSOC 
would cease to be used from time to time as a propaganda platform. 
The division between economic and political issues is not a hard and 
fast or a very clear one, so that the various "cold wars" will no doubt 
continue to invade an ECOSOC session as they have done in the 
past. Members who can amicably discuss the technical assistance 
program become less friendly when questions such as forced labor 
or Arab refugees are brought to their notice. Sometimes con- 
troversial items are introduced into the agenda in order to score 
points in the propaganda war, but this should not blind us to the fact 
that in economic and social as in political matters there are profound 
differences in outlook and feelings. No reform of ECOSOC, how- 
ever far-reaching, will brinh; a speedy end to a debate between a free 
and a planned economy. 
It would be useful if ECOSOC and its subordinate organs could 
make increasing use of independent technical experts in initiating 
and conducting studies. This has been done in the case of the Sub- 
commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection 
of Minorities, the Permanent Central Opium Board, some of the 
subsidiary organs of the regional Economic Commissions, and the 
recent meeting of experts on the proposed Special U.N. Fund for 
Economic Development. Independent experts find it easier than gov- 
ernmental representatives to concentrate on technical questions and 
minimize political considerations. Related to this is the possibility of 
making greater use of "working parties" meeting in private during 
ECOSOC sessions in a search for agreement away from the glare 
of publicity. 
In one respect the changes which we have suggested might 
increase rather than diminish the tension in ECOSOC debates. Rep 
resentatives of a higher caliber would bring more public attention- 
in itself a desirable thing-to the work of the Council. This in its 
turn would increase the propaganda value of the meetings. There is 
much value in a high-level debate on the relative merits of indus- 
trialization and rural community development, but the public and 
the press seem at times to prefer a scrap. However, this is not neces- 
sarily a vicious circle. Recent debates on economic and social matters 
(both at ECOSOC and the General Assembly) have revealed a new 
alignment of parties in which the underdeveloped countries, if not 
from China at any rate from India to Peru, show a wonderful una- 
nimity in trying to force the industrialized nations of the West to 
come to their aid. So far the communist countries have been inter- 
ested spectators of this battle. If the underdeveloped countries can 
continue to press their claims with the force and good sense that 
they have shown so far, they may be able to induce capitalists and 
communists to compete for the privilege of helping them. 
It has also to be remembered that international action in the 
economic and social fields is not hampered by a history of failure as 
has been the case in the field of disarmament. Action may hitherto 
have been modest but this is due as much to the low priority given 
to it as to failure to agree on any action at all. In principle everyone 
supports the purposes of U.N. in this field; in practice the imple- 
mentation of these purposes is postponed. The history of the ex- 
panded program of technical assistance' shows what can be done 
when the nations are agreed on a course of action and are fired with 
enthusiasm for carrying it out. This program also shows how im- 
portant it is to secure international cooperation, since the defection 
of one important contributor may easily discourage the rest. Other 
fields in which agreement and cooperation have been achieved are 
for the most part technical and scientific ones. It would appear that 
governments are more ready to accept a scientist's view of what is 
good for the world than to follow the advice of economists or so- 
ciologists. It is not impossible, however, that a strong lead in one of 
the more controversial fields would win a response. 
Finally, we think that the NGOs can do more than they have 
done in the past to strengthen ECOSOC's work. NGOs have a 
special relationship to ECOSOC and have the right to present their 
views on items of the Council's agenda. Some NGOs have not been 
entirely satisfied with the machinery which ECOSOC has provided 
for this aspect of their consultative status. Improved methods of 
obtaining the views of NGOs have been discussed, and some are 
likely to be adopted by the Council Committee on NGOs. If NGOs 
are thus afforded better opportunities to make their views and ex- 
perience known to the Council, it is incumbent upon t p m  to per- 
form more adequately their task of making the work of the Council 
better known. 
The effectiveness of NGOs as supporters of ECOSOC has been 
somewhat impaired by their tendency to group themselves into sup- 
porters of UNICEF or WHO or some other single aspect of the 
social and economic work of U.N. Thus the size and breadth of the 
ECOSOC agenda divides the NGOs into small and sometimes com- 
peting groups. It is another case of the parts being greater or stronger 
than the whole. It may be asking rather a lot to expect a children's 
organization to take an intelligent interest in full employment; 
nevertheless, consideration might be given to adopting more widely 
an arrangement recently established in London. The Standing Con- 
ference on the Economic and Social Work of the United Nations 
(SCESWUN!) brings together a large number of NGOs in Britain 
and has adopted the practice of issuing resolutions over the names 
of supporting organizations. Groupings of this kind should prove 
effective in expressing unoflicial opinion to national governments. 
NGO representatives at New York or Geneva sometimes tend to 
forget that ECOSOC is made up of government delegates who often 
arrive bound by the instructions of their Ministries. More effort is 
needed in the national capitals to see that these instructions are 
favorable to making ECOSOC a more effective instrument. 
One point which NGOs could stress with their national govern- 
ments is the importance of providing for international social and 
economic work to be planned on a long-term basis. So far nearly all 
this work has depended on annual budgets whose renewal is far 
from assured. The recent experience of the technical assistance pro- 
gram shows how precarious this situation may be. Dr. Brock Chis- 
holm, former Director General of WHO, has expressed this difliculty 
in the following terms: 
". . . it must be recognized that progress in changing obsolete 
practices has been extremely slow. As an example of difficulty in 
adapting procedures to international needs is the inability of most 
countries to make financial commitments for more than the current 
fiscal year. The programs of international agencies cannot be effi- 
ciently planned over so short a span. Procurement of materials alone 
usually requires six to nine months. Budget-making begins of neces- 
sity two to three years in advance in view of the numerous essential 
discussions, clearances and training of local personnel . . ." 
NGOs should continue to urge greater support of United Na- 
tions programs. They should urge that this support, in so far as 
possible, be scheduled further in advance. Nations no doubt have 
good reasons to be proud of their own efforts on behalf of refugees 
or underdeveloped countries, but they should not make these efforts 
an excuse for failing to contribute to U.N. work. Nations which have 
declined to contribute to the Special U.N. Fund for Economic De- 
velopment (SUNFED) have based their rdusal on prior commit- 
ments to national programs. Frequently they are spending on these 
national programs far more than they would be expected to con- 
tribute to an international one. It might be supposed in consequence 
that the international program would not make any significant dif- 
ference to the work already being done. In fact, however, experience 
shows that U.N. technical assistance is often mare readily accepted . 
than assistance coming from one nation only, especially if that nation 
happens to be a great power. Furthermore, even a relatively small 
outlay such as SUNFED may demand from each Member Nation 
would contribute enormously to the effectiveness, authority, and 
prestige of U.N. 
This brings us to a more general and perhaps more intractable 
problem, that of increasing the international outlook among men 
everywhere. We are still living within the walls of national com- 
munities and concentrating on the defense of these communities 
against real or imagined human enemies. It will be an extremely 
d%cult task to wean men from their customary thinking in and on 
behalf of natidnal groups and to transmit their energies into an 
attack on ignorance, poverty, and disease. Nevertheless, the successful 
completion of the social and economic tasks of U.N. demand this 
sort of transformation in men's thinking. 
Summary of Suggestions 
1. Governments should be encouraged (by non-governmental groups 
and by others) to take more important policy questions in inter- 
national social and economic affairs to the Economic and Social 
Council. 
2. In order to avoid overlong sessions, the agenda items,are being 
classified and certain sessions devoted to a few important questions 
of world-wide interest. The value of the debates on these important 
questions would be greatly enhanced if governments were repre- 
sented by delegates of a high rank. 
3. If possible the ECOSOC session at which high ranking officials 
discuss important matters should be held at a time when the U.N. 
program is otherwise fairly quiet. This would enable ECOSOC 
to enjoy a little more of the limelight. The dangers involved in this 
are clear, but the- advantages might outweigh them. 
4. In the initiation of studies by ECOSOC, greater use should be 
made of independent technical experts and less use made of inter- 
' governmental commissions. As a rule agreement on technical con- i/ 
* siderations is-easier if political considerations can be left out of 
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account. Subsequent political agreement which cannot easily be 
dispensed with may be facilitated if the experts have first agreed 
on the technical aspects of the matter under discussion. 
5. NGOs should seek more effective ways of making ECOSOC's 
activities better known. They should & i d  as much as possible 
becoming partisans of limited aspects of ECOSOC's work but, 
singly and cooperatively, should encourage governments to support 
steps to make ECOSOC a more effective instrument. They should 
urge governments to supplement national programs of aid with 
financial and other support for international U.N. programs. They 
should urge that, in so far as possible, governments schedule con- 
tributions further in advance to permit more orderly program 
planning. 
I11 &PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
Is there enough power undergirding the efforts of the United 
Nations to settle political disputes? If not, what types of additional 
power, or authority, would contribute to dy effectiveness of the 
U.N.'s peaceful settlement work? 
These questions are basic to the considerations surrounding any 
Charter review conference. There is no reason, however, for these 
questions to be any easier to answer in the field of international dis- 
putes than would similar questions which might be asked in the field 
of labor-management disputes-or indeed in any form of conflict 
settlement. Every dispute has its own characteristics and its own 
human equation. The general field of dispute settlement has always 
been one in which generalization is hazardous. But with a Charter 
review conference in prospect, some analysis should be attempted. 
Before venturing on this uneasy ground let us look briefly at the 
general setting in which the U.N.'s more specific mediation and 
conciliation work takes place. 
Buttressing the special efforts of the United Nations to settle 
particular conflicts such as those in Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir, 
and South Africa has been the general work of the organization in 
the economic, social, and trusteeship fields. By the constant adjust- 
ment of conflicting economic interests, by stimulating economic- 
development programs through the provision of technical assistance, 
by helping to establish common objectives in the social field, and by 
providing a framework through which dependent peoples can 
progress toward self-government, the United Nations is helping to 
channel into patterns of orderly evolution a multiplicity of problems 
-many of which would otherwise develop into threats to peace. This 
is peaceful settlement at its best-in the early stages and on a pre- 
ventive basis. 
No less important is the general political work of the General 
Assembly. Here, at the beginning of each Assembly, each national 
delegation has the opportunity to air its grievances, to state its con- 
cerns, and to make its contribution to the climate of opinion in which 
the succeeding political business will be conducted. While more and 
more specific disputes are being brought to the attention of the Gen- 
era1 Assembly, the Assembly is especially well adapted to the trans 
action of what might be called "general political business of inter- 
national interest." b 
The Assembly is the town meeting of the world. Thus to refer 
to it is not to deprecate its power-as anyone familiar with a New 
England town meeting should know. Trial balloons are sent u p  
and brought down! Log-rolling and block voting take place. But 
beneath it all essential fact-finding and fact-assessing take place. In- 
fluences of conciliation and mediation are brought to bear. Important 
principles are delineated and agreed upon. Adjustments and com- 
promises take place. This is essential international political business 
in the modern world--conducted as it must be in a common setting. 
It would be difticult to maintain that the General Assembly would 
be any less effective if its membership were universal. On the con- 
trary its prestige and effectiveness as an organ of conciliation would, 
we believe, be enhanced if there were a prompt move toward uni- 
versality. 
If the Assembly is to play an increasingly effective role in the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, either directly or through subsidiary 
bodies, must it be given more legal power through a Charter review 
(or revision) conference ? 
Scope and Powers of the 
General Assembly 
While the United Nations Charter conferred upon the Security 
Council special responsibilities in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, substantial responsibilities were also given to the 
General Assembly. Under the Charter the General Assembly may 
(1) "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the 
present Charter . . .";I (2) "consider the general principles of co- 
operation in the maintenance of international peace and secu- 
rity . . (3) "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance 
of international peace and security brought before it by any Member 
of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which 
is not a Member of the United Nations . . .";3 (4) "initiate studies 
and make recommendations for the purpose of . . . promoting inter- 
1 Art. 10. 
2 Art. 1 I, par. 1. 
3 Art. 11, par. 2. 
national cooperation in the political field. . . ."4 "Subject to the 
provisions of Article 12 [consideration by the Security Council], the 
General Assembly may reconimend measures for the peaceful adjust- 
ment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to 
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, in- 
cluding situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the I 
present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations.'" 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish any prob 
lun of peaceful settlement which would be excluded from General 
Assembly consideration under these broad provisions. Excepted only 
are questions under consideration by the Security Council. A means 
for the orderly and vetoless transfer of any of these problems to the 
General Assembly "if the Security Council is failing to exercise its 
function of maintaining international peace and security" is provided 
by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the General As- 
sembly in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War. 
If the General Assembly has sufIicient scope to consider any 
. problems which might arise, what of its power to deal with this wide 
range of issues ? 
There are two principal aspects to this felt need for more power 
in the United Nations. The first concern is for an organization with 
su6eient moral, economic, political, and police s t r ena  for would-be 
adventurers to be deterred by this combined strength (and by pre- 
dictable consequences) from embarking upon, or continuing, a 
course of action lea- to the disruption of the international public 
order. A second concern is for the authority and prestige to deal with 
political disputes-if possible before they become threats to the peace. 
The United Nations Charter distinguishes, in general, between 
the functions of the Organization in handling threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression (Chapter VII) and the 
settlement of the background political disputes which may have 
caused the disruption of public order (Chapter VI). In the former 
case the Organization may make recommendations for (or, in the 
case of the Security Council, decide upon) measures, including the 
use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. In its efforts, however, to get a settlement of the political 
issues which may have caused the dispute, the primary reliance is 
4 Art. 13, par. 1. 
aArt.14. . 
upon the methods of investigation, conciliation, and mediation. In 
dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of 
aggression under Chapter VII it is even suggested that, in calling 
upon the parties to a dispute to comply with provisional measures, 
these measures might well be "without prejudice to the rights, claims, 
or position of the parties concerned."@ In its work under Chapter VI 
the Security Council may go so far as to recommend terms of settle- 
ment if it "deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and ~ecurity."~ 
Otherwise, while the Council may recommend or initiate appropriate 
methods or procedures of adjustment, it may make recommendations 
with regard to terms of settlement only on the request of the partiesO8 
It is evident that those who framed the Charter believed that the 
full power of the United Nations should be used to restrain threats 
to the peace and, if a breach of the peace or an act of aggression had 
already occurred, to restore international peace and security. While 
they were not prepared to have this same power used to enforce a 
particular form of political settlement, the Security Council was 
empowered to recommend terms of settlement if the Council con- 
cluded that international peace and security were "likely to be 
endangered." A similar power appears now to reside in the General 
Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. 
In other types of conflict settlement a public recommendation 
by the mediating body has often proved an effective means of 
securing agreement. The fact that even this limited power of recom- 
mendation has been used so infrequently by the U.N. suggests that 
Charter limitations may not at the present time be a major handicap 
to the development of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement activities. If the 
members of the United Nations have been reluctant to encourage the 
use of that power which the Organization now possesses, it is even 
more unlikely that they would, barring a drastic alteration in inter- 
national legal relationships, take the further step of bringing some 
form of compulsory arbitration more into the forefront of the U.N.'s 
peaceful settlement work. 
- 
Not all the advocates of more power for the General Assembly 
are seeking an increase in its legal power. Mr. John Foster Dulles, in 
his speech of January 18, 1954, before the Subcommittee on the 
6 Art. .40. 
7 Art. 37. 
8 Art. 38. 
best arrangement? If the &era1 Assembly is to assume greater re- 
sponsibilities, then should there not be some form of weighted voting, 
so that nations which are themselves unable to assume serious military 
or financial responsibilities cannot put those responsibilities on other 
whereby affirmative action requires both a majority of all the mem- 
nations? Should there be, in some matters, a combination vote; 
i bers, on the basis of sovereign equality, and also a majority vote, onl. 
a weighted basis, which takes into account population, resources,? 
The Secretary obviously had in mind the exploration of 
Charter changes which might give more practical political power toi 
ter modifications which it might at some future time be possible to 
3 
the General Assembly. It is difficult in theory to argue against ~ h a r - k d i  
achieve along these lines. The present voting system does exert cer- 
tain restraints on the large powers. This makes for a system in which 
at times the full scope of the diplomatic resources of these powers .- 
has been used in the search for support on certain issues. While there$$ 
are some countries that would look with favor on voting changes in 
the Assembly, it seems likely that if the United States were to empha- 
size such revision as one of its principal objectives in a Charter review 
conference, many of the small countries would lose some of their 
interest in such a conference. They are not likely to look with favor ,- 
on revisions which would reduce their power. Even a simple majority T? 
vote on the holding of such a conference might under these 
stances be very dificult to obtain. 
Creating an 
instrument of Trust 
3 - 
4 -, 5 
In questions of the settlement of international disputes, the essen- {f+ 
tial problem is not that of the legal power of the United Nations. $'$ 
The problem is that of creating out of the United Nations an instru- :! 
ment of trust which can be relied upon to render effective service in 
the peaceful settlement field. While certain minor adjustments in the 
Charter might facilitate the creation of such an instrument, the basic - 
problem is not the formal enabling powers of the Charter. It is a 
' .. LH? 
question of assembling within this area of U.N. activity persons who ''s 
because of their political wisdom and experience, their insight into 
contemporary issues, and their personal integrity inspire confidence 
that the vital national interests with which they deal will be handled 
with resourcefulness, patience, and care. It is also a question of estab 
lishing a more effective means through which certain lessons can 
be drawn from past experience-experience both inside and outside 
the United Nations. 
Let us look first at this question of past experience. The United 
Nations staff is now engaged in the assembling of a general repertory 
of Security Council experience and of general experience under the 
Charter. But not since-the Interim Committee was, for all practical 
purposes, laid to rest in 1950 have the members of the United Nations 
made any sustained effort to draw lessons from the U.N.'s past work 
in dispute settlement. Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico in September 
- 
1952, on the occasion of his turning over the presidency of the Gen- 
eral Assembly to Lester B. Pearson of Canada, suggested that the 
General ~ s s e m b l ~  establish a committee to concern itself with the 
development of the U.N.'s peaceful settlement work and that this 
committee operate parallel to the Collective Measures Committee. 
This apparently useful suggestion was not taken up by the General 
Assembly. 
What new approaches might a review of past experience - 
suggest r' 
While different disputes call for different handling there has 
been a'general trend in recent years away from extensive debate and 
"instructed" commissions toward a more flexible and informal use 
of the United Nations' peaceful settlement facilities. It is easy to 
understand the reluctance of states to turn to the United Nations for 
help in a dispute in which they are a party if the U.N.'s first move is 
to be a public debate in the Security Council or in the General As- 
sembly. The debate is certain to bring new political influences into 
the situation, some of them extraneous and many of them unpre- 
dictable. The general debate has the possibility of aggravating the 
dispute and sometimes of making its ultimate solution more difficult. 
Thus a state's decision to submit a dispute to the United Nations is 
usually based on its estimate of the possibilities of picking up support 
for its case. 
But suppose it were possible for the United Nations to provide, 
initially, a more informal (and less legislative) type of aid to the 
disputants. Might there not under these circumstances be a freer 
turning to the United Nations and a freer use of its facilities? 
r ~ # ~  ,&& *%, 7 )  , .. ' & -**:.&$': 
The secretary-%enera19s 
Key Role 
The initial point of regular informal political contact in the 
United Nations is the oftice of the Secretary-General. It would appear 
to have been the intention of the framers of the present Charter that 
the oflice of the Secretary-General should, in its political functions, 
be developed over and above that of the comparable oftice in the 
League of Nations. Under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, 
"the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security 
Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security." 
It is apparent that both the first Secretary-General and the pres- 
ent one have conceived of their role as being a broad one. Probably 
no single individual connected with the U.N.'s peaceful settlement 
work can have as much influence as the Secretary-General in build- 
ing confidence in the United Nations' political work and in making 
the organization a "trusted instrument." In order, however, to fulfill 
effectively his ofttimes quiet and backstage role, the Secretary- 
General must have a group of senior ofticers in the political field who 
can keep him constantly apprised of important developments in all 
major geographical regions with which he must deal. The method 
through which this skilled political advice is made available is less 
important than that it should be available within the Organization 
as a whole. The dictates of good administration would appear to 
suggest that such a staff should either be located in the Department 
of Political and Security Council Affairs or attached to the Executive 
Oftice of the Secretary-General. 
Supplemental to those on his own staff on whom he can call, 
the Secretary-General has two other principal sources of political and 
diplomatic experience to which he can turn-for either informal or 
formal assistance. 
The heads of the 60 permanent delegations to the U.N. are 
continuously available. Some of them have had extensive diplomatic 
experience and many of them can be focal points of conciliation as 
issues are weighed and negotiated both before and during considera- 
tion by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The repre- 
sentatives of certain countries are often able, for reasons both of 
geography and interest, to be of special assistance to the Secretary- 
General on an informal basis. In making the United Nations a 
trusted instrument of political negotiation there can be no substitute 
for the closest diplomatic relationship between the Secretary-General 
and the heads of the delegations representing the Member States. 
The Secretary-General and the principal oficers of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council have another diplomatic resource 
which could be much more fully used. On April 28,1949, the General 
Assembly established a Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation. The in- 
ternational Panel was to be composed of persons who "by reason of 
their training, experience, character and standing, are deemed to be 
well fitted to serve as members of commissions of inquiry or of con- 
ciliation and who would be disposed to serve in that capacity." Each 
Member State was permitted to designate five persons. The Panel 
was to be available to the Security Council and the General Assem- 
bly, to their subsidiary organs, or to Member States involved in con- 
troversies. The method of selection was to be determined in each case 
by the appointing organ. Upon the joint request of the parties to a 
controversy, appointment could be by the Secretary-General, the 
President of the General Assembly, or the chairman of the Interim 
Committee. The administration of the Panel was lodged with the 
Secretar y-General. 
The theory behind the Panel was an eminently good one. It was 
believed that it would facilitate the U.N.'S dispute settlement work 
to have in being a roster of persons well qualified for service as 
members of mediation or conciliation commissions-prsons who in 
accepting designation had entered into certain informal undertak- 
ings as to availability and interest and who were of sufficient emi- 
nence to have been designated by their own governments. Initial 
designations were for five years. These five years have elapsed, and 
the time has now come for the Panel to be reconstituted. 
The United Nations Charter encourages parties to a dispute to 
attempt to settle the conflict themselves before bringing it to the 
United Nations. Should not disputing parties at times be encouraged 
to turn to the international Panel and by agreement to secure the 
services of one of its members as a mediator and conciliator? Follow- 
ing the lead given by other types of contracts or commercial agree- 
ments, treaties between states might provide for certain types of 
disputes under the treaty to be subjected to mediation or to arbitra- 
tion by a qualified person selected £rom the Panel by the two parties 
or by the Secretary-General. The Panel has to date been used only 
once-in the selection by the Security Council of Dr. Frank P. 
Graham as mediator in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. 
The Panel constitutes a resource for peaceful settlement which could 
be more fully used by the United Nations. 
The trend toward a more informal type of political negotiation 
is further indicated in the increasing use which has been made of the 
office of the President of the ~ene i a l  Assembly. At the first part of 
the third session of the General Assembly, held in Paris in 1948, 
Mr. Evatt of Australia was associated with an effort, authorized by 
the Assembly, to conciliate the dispute over the Greek children. In 
1950, as President of the Assembly, Mr. Entezam of Iran served as 
chairman of two different good offices commissions set up by the 
General Assembly in an effort to seek a solution of the Korean con- 
flict. During the fall of 1951 Mr. Padilla Nervo of Mexico, as Presi- 
dent of the~ssembl~,  served as the chairman of a closed conference 
of the principal powers concerned which made an effort, during the 
Assembly, to break the disarmament deadlock. Mr. Pearson of Can- 
ada during his presidency of the General Assembly in the fall of 
1952 was deeply involved in efforts to achieve an armistice in Korea. 
The articles relating to the composition and use of the Panel for 
Inquiry and Conciliation permit the President of the Assembly and 
the Secretary-General to appoint persons from the Panel to under- 
take tasks of inquiry or conciliation when requested to do so by a 
treaty or by the parties to a dispute. There would appear to be no 
reason, however, why the President of the General Assembly and the 
Secretary-General could not, if they so desired, associate some mem- 
ber of the Panel with them in any informal conciliatory work in 
which they were engaged. Both men are free to appoint such assist- 
ants as they require. Through such informal association, experience 
could be gained against the time when formal appointment might 
be made by conflicting parties or some special responsibility assigned 
by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Persons from the 
reconstituted Panel could be asked occasionally to serve as rapporteur 
of the Security Council, in keeping with the recommendati6i of the 
Interim Committee in April 1949. - 
The history of international mediation has been a history of the 
search for the impartial and effective third party. We have com- 
mented on the importance of having readily available, competent, 
and impartial individuals who are in a position to use their good 
offices in disputes previous to or during the more formal considera- 
tion of thesequestions by one of the established organs of the United 
Nations. Let us now turn to alternative methods that might be em- 
ployed by the Security Council, the General Assembly, or a subsidiary 
organ in the consideration of disputes. 
Privacy 
in Negotiation 
It has been suggested that a rapporteur might be appointed to 
negotiate with the parties following the opening statements by the 
parties in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. The 
President of the Security Council has at times performed this func- 
tion. There are times when it is desirable for the opening statements 
of the parties to be followed by statements on the part of other mem- 
bers which reveal the degree to which sentiment exists for peaceful 
settlement--or for a particular type of settlement. To allow the de- 
bate to go on to the passage of a resolution frequently results, how- 
ever, in a hardening of positions and an exacerbation of the conflict. 
It has been suggested, therefore, that the Security Council and 
possibly even the General Assembly should experiment with a plan 
under which, in certain cases, it would terminate debate following 
the principal statements on the part of all interested parties and at 
that point turn the negotiation over to a more private treatment. 
This suggestion is well worth exploring. The Security Council has 
already begun to experiment with a variant of this approach in 
occasionally taking a "consensus of views" rather than calling for a 
formal vote. We have mentioned the working party approach as used 
on the disarmament question at the 1951 session of the General 
Assembly in Paris, when the debate in the Political Committee was 
adjourned to permit a ten-day closed conference of the countries 
principally concerned to meet under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla 
Nervo, the President of the Assembly. A similar approach was used 
by the Second Committee during the 1953 session, when a subcom- 
mittee met in closed session under the chairmanship of Mr. Mates 
of Yugoslavia in an effort to reach agreement on the Special United 
Nations Fund for Economic Development. 
Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that the United Na- 
tions has by no means exhausted the possibilities of further shaping 
its procedures and its personnel in ways which could aid it in gaining - 
the confidence and trust of its members in its work in peaceful set- 
tlement. It is not so much by reaching after the spectacular as by 
"month to month" .gains in these areas that the U.N.'s reputation 
will eventually be built 
Power to Recommend 
Terms of Settlement 
Let us return now to the question of the power of the Security 
Council or of the General Assembly, or of one of their subsidiary 
organs, to recommend terms of settlement to parties in dispute. We 
have indicated that this was a power which the United Nations has 
thus far been reluctant to use. Mediators or conciliation cofnmissions 
have frequently urged the parties in private to accept particular terms 
of settlement, but the Council and the General Assembly have been 
chary of attempting to go on record on behalf of such detailed terms. 
The veto is a constant hazard in the Security Council, and the Gen- 
eral Assembly because of its size is hardly adapted to the detailed 
consideration required in these matters. Furthermore, such resolu- 
tions tend to freeze the situation and reduce possibilities of later 
compromise. There are, therefore, substantial arguments against 
more frequent attempts by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly to recommend specific terms of settlement. 
Could not a case be made, however, for subsidiary negotiating 
organs, appointed either by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly, to have more freedom to make recommendations for set- 
tlement, and to release these recommendations if they felt that public 
coqideration of them might promote a settlement? It seems likely 
that if the negotiating organs had the power to publicize recom- 
mendations, the disputing parties might take these recommendations 
more seriously in the preceding private negotiations. We have sug- 
gested that this has been the experience in other types of conflict 
settlement. It is the usual practice for the parent body to retain its 
freedom of action, but public discussion of recommendations made 
by a subsidiary body enables both parties to assess more accurately 
their respective positions-and the needs and possibilities of com- 
promise. 
It would undoubtedly be very much easier for U.N. commissions 
and mediators to develop and use recommendations if, as proposed 
by the Vandenberg resolution adopted by the Senate in June 1948, 
the veto could be removed by voluntary agreement from "all ques- 
tions involving peaceful settlement of international disputes and 
p 
situations." The Security Council would then be able y slmple 
majority vote to fix flexible terms of reference for its subsidiary nego- 
tiating bodies. It would also be freed to give more active support-to 
such bodies, including, if it appeared in order, support to either 
general or specific recommendations for settlement. 
To what extent is Article 37 of the Charter a handicap to the 
development of this procedure? This article permits the Security 
Council to make recommendations on terms of settlement in cases 
in which the Council decides "that the continuance of the dispute is 
- 
in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security." The General Assembly has not been given such powers 
explicitly, but it would be difficult, following the series of Assembly 
resolutions on Palestine and the subsequent passage of the "Uniting 
for Peace" resolution, to maintain that such powers were lack in^. 
There is an understandable reluctance among states to have dis- 
putes to which they are a party deemed a danger to the peace. The 
words of Article 37, however, are mild ones-"likely to endanger." 
It would be dif£icult in this anxious and frequently trembling world 
to conclude that any dispute between two countries of suflicient im- 
portance to be put on the agenda of the Security Council or the 
General Assembly did not in fact fall into this category. There may 
be times, however, in which it is not politic or conducive to a prompt 
settlement to say so. It might thus be wise, at some time when other 
Charter revisions are being made, for Article 37 to be redrafted. In 
the meantime, in an international situation in which we are in much 
need of plain speaking about the importance of avoiding disturbances 
to the peace, this Article should not be a serious handicap to the 
development and use of the power to recommend terms of 
settlement. 
In a world so unsteadied by the ever-present possibility of the 
misuse of unprecedented power, who is there among us to say that 
our intergovernmental institutions would not serve us better if they 
could, with common consent, be substantially altered? But any such 
common consent will only flow from a much clearer conviction than 
appears now to be evident that our principal diiliculty lies in Charter 
limitations. Any general sampling among those reasonably well 
versed in United Nations affairs would, we believe, show an over- 
whelming conviction that we are not making effective use of the 
legal instrument we now have. Greater use can be made of the ogces 
of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. 
The Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation can be reconstituted. FU& 
use can be made of the power to make public recommendations 
While we seek opportunities and agreements to perfect the Charter 
let us realize that in creating an institution of trust, it i 
tion that makes the greatest difference. 
Note: This background study in substantially the same 
peared in the November 1954 issue of the Annals of the A 
& emy of Political and Social Science under the title "Developing the 
' I' Peaceful Settlement Functions of the United Nations." This issue of the 
0 -  Annals dealt with the future of the United Nations. 
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Summary of Suggestions I 
1. The conciliatory work of the General Assembly would be en- 
hanced if there were a prompt move toward universality of U.N. 
membership. 
2. The Security Council should put less emphasis on passing resolu- 
tions. It should experiment more frequently with turnink disputes 
over for some form of private negotiation after the interested par- 
ties have ex~ressed their views. :A4 
3. The ~enera i  Assembly has, on several recent occasions, suspended ?' 
debate and turned issues over temporarily to "working parties" - . '  
with instructions to the smaller group to see if they could find an 
acceptable compromise. This technique should be used more £re- 
quently during the General Assembly and occasionally, on the 
instructions of the Assembly, in an effort to make progress on , 
issues between regular sessions or while the Assembly is in 
adjournment. 
4. In view of the trend away from extended and formal debate of 
political disputes, and toward a more informal use of United Na- 
tions facilities for peaceful settlement, greater emphasis should be 
placed on conciliatory moves which might be initiated by the 
Secretary-General and by the President of the General Assembly. 
5. In April 1949 the General Assembly established an International 
pane[ on Inquiry and ~onciliationi The Panel was to be com- 
posed of persons from U.N. member countries qualified to serve 
the United Nations in fact-finding or conciliatory missions. Those 
persons nominated by governments were to serve for five years. 
The membership of this Panel should now be reconstituted. Per- 
sons serving on the Panel should be used more frequently in 
U.N.'s disp;te settlement work. 
6. The dispute settlement work of the Security Council is subject to 
the veto of any Permanent Member (U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France, 
China'). A new effort should be made to eliminate the veto in all 
questi6ns relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
7. The Security Council now has the power in international disputes 
to recommend terms of settlement if it "deems that the continuance 
of the dispute is, in fact, likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security" (Article 37, (2)), or "if all the 
parties to any dispute so request" (Article 38). The General As- 
sembly has such powers of recommendation under ,Article 11. 
Greater use should be made of these powers. 
8. At some time when Charter changes are being made, the language 
of Article 37 (see 7, above) should be altered to eliminate the 
restriction on recommendations of terms of settlement to situations 
"likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security ." 
roughout its history the Society of Friends has 
inst war. This conviction as to the evil 
Quakers into special efforts to remove the economic and social cause4 
of conflict and to promote the settlement of international disputes 
peaceful means. It has also promoted direct efforts to secure 
abolition of war as an institution and, through disarmament, 
restrict the means by which nations might make war on one moth 
The States which are members of the United Nations have in the 
Charter pledged themselves to "settle their international disputes b 
peaceful means" and to "refrain in their international relations fro 
the threat or use of force" (Article 2). But despite these undertak- 
ings, Members have found it impossible to act as though they had 
renounced war as a means of settling their disputes. States have con- 
tinued to place their primary reliance upon either their own armed 
strength or upon regional defense systems. The arms race has ac- 
celerated. Weapons of war have become progressively more destruc- 
tive and the competition in weapons of planet-destroying potentiali 
has clearly led to the point where only some radically new 
is likely to give us the security we seek. 
There are those who would rely on the horr 
weapons as the principal safeguard against their use. To thoughtfu 
and sensitive political and military leaders a revulsion against the 
probable results of using these weapons is undoubtedly a powerful 
deterrent. But the general concern with which the disarmament ne- 
gotiations in the United Nations are being followed suggests that ar# 
increasing number of people are looking for a security system which 
would remove the principal weapons of war and not be so dependen 
on a balance of power or on the forces of self-restraint. 
An agreement on disarmament has been exceedingly difficult 
attain. Any such agreement is obviously related to the lessening o 
political tensions and to the achievement of political agreements 
especially over Germany and Formosa. Settlement of issues a 
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vated by the "cold war" would facilitate agreement on disarmament. 
But it is @y true that a workable disarmament scheme would, if 
adopted, greatly facilitate settlement of the other problems which so 
deeply divide the major powers. Even the serious discussion of dis- 
armament programs can contribute to the general lessening of 
tensions. 
Although it is not directly part of a disarmament plan, the move 
in the United Nations toward international cooperation to develop 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy is an example of the type of inter- 
national arrangement which could eventually facilitate agreement 
on disarmament. Delegates have referred in U.N. General Assembly 
debates and in the meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Sub-commis- 
sion to the importance of developing plans for using atomic energy 
constructively as an accompaniment to a program for controlling the 
destructive uses of atomic power. There is cause for considerable 
optimism in the achievements of the Ninth ~enera l '~ssembl~,  which 
voted unanimously in favor of the establishment of an International 
Atomic Energy Agency to facilitate world-wide use of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes. This Assembly also supported unanimously 
.the calling of an international conference to consider means of 
developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy through international 
cooperation. Success in this area may well help to create a climate in 
international relations which would permit significant progress in 
the disarmament field. 
The main purpose of this background study is to examine the 
manner in which disarmament might affect, or be affected by, the 
structure and functioning of the United Nations. The essential fea- 
'tures of a disarmament program will be brought out by considering 
several questions some of them still controversial. These questions 
will need to be considered at great length by experts as well as by 
the general public, but as a basis for discussion of U.N. Charter 
revision brief answers are suggested here. 
What Should Be 
the Purpose of Disarmament? 
The purpose should be not merely to ease tax burdens or to make 
war more humane; it should be to eliminate the possibility that war 
will occur. a 
q - m  
Should a World Disarmament Plan Provide or a .I 
Partial Reduction of Armaments or for Their Complete 
Elimination, with the Exception of Such Arms as 
Would Be Necessary to Preserve Internal Order 
and to Fulfill Charter Obligations? 
The United Nations Charter apparently does not envisage com- ' 
plete disarmament, but arms limitation and regulation. The Charter , 
makes reference to disarmament and the regulation of armaments. 
For example, the General Assembly is given the power to discuss the - 
general principles governing these matters and to make recommen- 
dations to the Security Council (Article 11). The Security Council 
is charged with the responsibility of formulating plans to be sub- 
mitted to Member States "for the establishment of a system for the 
regulation of armaments" (Article 26). The Charter provides for 
military forces to be put at the disposition of the Security Council 
for the purpose of suppressing aggression. 
The present efforts in the United Nations Disarmament Com- 
mission are directed to the early limitation of national armies down , 
to agreed levels and the abolition and control of weapons of mass 
destruction. Various governmental statements have been made sug- 
gesting an ultimate goal of disarmament down to levels needed for 
internal national policing and to fulfill U.N. Charter obligations. 
There are good reasons why this ultimate goal should be given much 
more thorough consideration as an immediate objective. Both practi- 
cal and moral reasons may be advanced in favor of such substantial 
disarmament. Attempts to determine the quantities of armaments, 
the types of weapons, the number of men under arms, etc., to be 
allowed for almost 100 states would inevitably lead to prolonged 
disagreement. Agreement on the first steps might actually be easier 
to reach in the context of a much larger plan which provided for the 
fixing of the internal policing levels eventually to be reached in 
proportion to national population and similar factors. Moreover, in- 1 
spection and enforcement are likely to be more difticult if nations 
retain some offensive weapons and the forces capable of employing 
them. We believe any disarmament scheme should provide for the 
ultimate elimination of all armed forces, all armaments, and all 
weapons except for such forces and small arms as might be necessary 
for maintaining order within each country and fulfilling U.N. 
Charter obligations. 
Should a Disarmament Plan Be Universal, 
Applying to All Nations? 
It is clear that any politically possible disarmament plan would 
need to include all the major powers, including the People's Republic 
of China. It might be essential that the eventual agreement include 
all countries. At some point those countries not represented in the 
United Nations must be brought into the negotiations. While any 
agreement among the major powers would likely be considered first 
in the United Nations General Assembly, a United Nations spon- 
sored General Disarmament Conference might possibly be the place 
to seek the formal approval of the wider U.N. Membership. 
Should Conventional Weapons and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Be Covered by the Same Disarmament 
Plan and Controlled by the Same Machinery? 
It would probably be most practical to have a single system to 
cover all types of armaments. Conventional and nuclear weapons are 
apparently too interrelated in their use to permit effective control of 
one unless co-ordinated with control of the other. The U.N. recog- 
nized this when it formed a single Disarmament Commission to 
replace the two which had formerly been working separately on 
atomic matters and conventional weapons. 
What Should Be the Nature of an Inspection 
Agency-its Powers, Functions and Procedures? 
The powers of an inspectorate should include authority to ex- 
amine documents relating to military budgets; to enter each country 
and to move to any point within the country at will; to maintain 
observers at strategicpoints to watch for dangerous concentrations 
of armed forces or weapons; to enter any factory or installation (with 
the exceptions to be specified); to secure pertinent information by 
whatever means it deemed best, such as questioning managers or 
employees, observing processes, counting, weighing, or measuring 
materials, or consulting records; and to assemble and communicate 
the results of its inquiries to appropriate headquarters. It should not 
be given authority to undertake any correction of conditions based 
on its discoveries but would report its findings to a U.N. organ. It 
should be a tedmhlly. cotxlpe~~nt &;Lan furce,-ond. &odd. not ire 
armed. The insphctorate would be under ,the .generql dl+n of .an 
International Control Agency or a Disarmament ~ u t h o f i t ~ .  
These powers are suggested in the belid that the duty of the 
inspectorate would be to observe and certify the destruction or other 
disposition of aimaments in all countries and, thereafter, to detect 
any attempt to manufacture or accumulate arms or train soldiers 
which had been restricted by international agreement. Inspection to 
accomplish this end would have to be unfettered and continuous. It 
would be necessary to guard against abuse of this power and inter- 
ference with 'the peaceful economic facilities of the countries in 
which the inspectorate was working. However, shce its purpose 
would be to detect illegal activities, the inspectorate should not be 
so limited that such activities could .escape detection. Complaints 
about improper exercise of authority by inspectors would be lodged 
with the Disarmament Authority for consideration and action. 
In view of the uncertainty that now prevails as to whether any 
inspection force could, in fact, be assured that all atomic and hydro- 
gen weapons had been rendered useless for destructive purposes, the 
inspection force should concern itself with the various possibilities 
that exist for the delivery of such weapons. 
How Should the Problem 
of Compliance Be Handled? 
This is one of the most difficult aspects of the disarmament prob- 
lem. We have suggested earlier that disarmament down to agreed 
levels for national armies, while no doubt a desirable first step, repre- 
sents an inadequate goal. While inspection machinery could be 
established for such a disarmament plan, effective means of dealing 
with violations would be dif£icult in the face of still substantial 
national armies. Violations or suspected violations of the disarma- 
ment treaty could be taken by the Disarmament Authority to the 
United Nations Security Council or to the General Assembly or both, 
and the issues could be debated and the force of world public opinion 
brought to bear. Special investigating commissions could be-estab- 
lished to weigh the facts. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 
the General Assembly could recommend economic, political, or mili- 
tary measures against the country believed to be violating the dis 
armament agreement. But these measures all carry the weakness 
qtith which. the United Nations .is already beset. They do not give 
*suancee af getting beyond the use af war as a sanction. Our sights 
need to be on a .mote viable security system. 
A second approach is disarmament of national armies down to 
the levels needed for internal policing and the creation of a United 
Nations armed police force. There are many people who believe that 
during the period required for any step-by-step reduction of national 
armaments, there should be in existence a United Nations armed 
force capable of balancing out any temporary inequities or dis- 
equilibrium which might develop in progressive disarmament under 
an agreed plan. The efforts, however, to make the Military Staff 
Co&tteeteean effective instrument of the United Nations foundered 
on the conflicts inherent in the "cold war." It does not seem likely 
that at the present time the U.S.S.R. would take kindly to a move 
now to create any new United Nations armed force capable of acting 
against either armed or partially armed States and free from the 
veto. The tensions of,the East-West conflict will probably force those 
concerned with disatmament questions to seek other solutions than 
the two which we have discussed thus far. 
A third approach would be to give the U.N. or one of its organs 
authority to deal directly by judicial process with individuals (rather 
than governments) found guilty of violating the disarmament agree- 
ment. Some advocates of limited world federation maintain that any 
disarmament plan, if it is to be effective, must provide for this degree 
of direct action upon individuals. If this procedure were adopted, 
the disarmament treaty would presumably provide that the domestic 
jurisdiction provisions of the Charter did not apply in such cases. It 
would establish procedures under which such persons would be 
apprehended and brought before an international court which would 
.apply the "disarmament law." 
There is a great need for extending the rule of law in the inter- 
national community. There would be many reasons for questioning 
the effectiveness of the present collective security system, even in a 
partially disarmed world. Many people believe that a disarmament 
treaty can provide the occasion for new and important developments 
in international law, but few people are clear as to just what these 
should be. 
It would seem likely that the types of inspection, verification 
and compliance problems which would arise under a disarmament 
treaty would be better handled within the general pattern of ad- 
ministrative 1aw.than they would be in the present pattern of politi- 
cal action by the United Nations. To move in this direction would 
mean a major extension of the international legal system and in all 
likelihood the modification of the Statute of the present Interna- 
tional Court or the. creation of a new court to deal with disarmament 
problems. It would not necessarily mean the application of "disarma- 
ment law" to individuals. National law provides for legal action 
against corporations, against municipalities, and even against politi- 
cal bodies. While oficers of these bodies are sometimes held person- 
ally responsible, it is usually the organized unit against which the 
legal or enforcement action is taken. 
The pattern of international legal development would obvi- 
ously have to be built on the special requirements of the disarma- 
ment-security problem. It would need to be related effectively to 
differing patterns of national jurisprudence. The development should 
be such, however, that it deals as directly as possible with the "par- 
ties" believed responsible for violations of the treaty. In view ~f the 
gravity of the security problem now faced by the international com- 
munity, it should be possible to accompany disarmament with an 
enforcement pattern which minimizes action against major political 
units. This is an area in which an enormous amount of legal work 
needs to be done. 
A general enforcement pattern of this kind would mean that, 
in cases of suspected violation of the disarmament agreement, fol- 
lowing the verification of the inspector's report by the central in- 
spection authorities, an attempt would first be made by the Disarma- 
ment Authority through regular administrative channels to get 
compliance or cooperation. If this failed, the facts would be made 
public. If defiance continued, the case would be taken to the DroDer 
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international court to get a restraining order against the responsible 
66 party" or unit. 
It would be only those cases that defied settlement by legal 
means or major and flagrant violations of the agreement that would 
be taken to a political organ of the United Nations. 
We thus have two major suggestions as to how the problems of 
enforcement can be handled. First, the more substantial the extent 
of agreed disarmament, the easier it will be to ensure that the agree- 
ment is enforced. Second, that increasing emphasis should be placed 
on the non-political aspects of disarmament enforcement. Inspection 
is a technical function. The U.N. machinery for dealing with threats 
to or breaches of the peace is a political function. Between these two 
' there should be a middle stage-so developed as to constitute the 
primary reliance. It would be based upon fact-finding and concilia- 
tion, and would culminate in a judicial process. It is possible that all 
except major and flagrant breaches of a disarmament agreement 
could be handled in this way without involving the present U.N. 
machinery for dealing with threats to or breaches of the peace. 
What Should Be the Timing of the Various Steps 
in Carrying Out Disarmament? 
The question of timing has been one on which wide disagree- 
ment formerly existed between the Soviet and Western powers. From 
the inception of disarmament discussions within the U.N. until 1954 
the U.S.S.R. insisted upon a complete and unconditional ban on 
weapons of mass destruction as the first step to disarmament. The 
Western powers suspected that the Soviet Union was attempting to 
neutralize their most important weapons in order to leave itself in 
a position to dominate the West with its stronger conventional 
armaments. 
At the meetings of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London 
in 1954, France and the United Kingdom submitted a proposal for 
timing, the most noteworthy feature of which was a provision for 
a conditional ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction as the 
first step. Under such an agreement, all powers would agree not to 
use the prohibited weapons except in defense against aggression. 
Although little progress toward agreement was apparent in the 
London discussions in 1954, optimism was generated during the 
Ninth Session of the General Assembly later in the year. At that time 
the Soviet Union agreed to accept the Anglo-French proposals as a 
basis of discussion at further meetings of the Disarmament Sub- 
commission. It now seems that agreement on this dificult question 
may be in sight. 
Disarmament and 
the United Nations 
How would a disarmament plan relate to the United Nations? 
We have already touched on this question. Before considering 
it further let us first summarize a few of the thoughts developed in 
the preceding discussion concerning the nature of an effective dis - '1 b 
armament plan. The plan should: 
1. Be based upon agreement among the major powers. 
2. Be framed in a treaty applying to all nations, which s h d d  
if possible be accepted by the vast majority of the world's 
nations, including of course the major powers. 
3. Cover both conventional weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction. 
4. Express the agreed-upon basis for disarmament. 
a) The extent to which disarmament was to be carried. 
b) The stages through which the elimination of armaments 
and armed forces would proceed. 
c) A timetable for the accomplishment of the various stages. 
5. Provide for progression from stage to stage. 
6. Establish an international inspection force and define its 
duties, authority, procedures, and relationships to a Disarma- 
ment Authority. 
7. Define the relationships of the Disarmament Authority to ' 
the United Nations and to its organs. 
It is hard to imagine ktfective arguments for creating a disarma- 
ment plan separate from the United Nations. Indeed, several con- 
siderations suggest that the disarmament machinery be made - 
integral part of the United Nations. First, the United Nations would 
be strengthened by being able to make real progress toward one of 
its major objectives-the maintenance of peace; second, existing 
1 
machinery, personnel, and facilities of the United Nations could be 
used in connection with the plan, thus avoiding duplication; third, 
coordination with other activities of the United Nations would be 
easier. 
We have suggested the desirability of an enforcement system 
which would be based upon new developments in the international 
judicial system. The Disarmament Authority to be created as a spe- 
cial organ of the United Nations in the disarmament treaty would 
report to the Security Council, the General Assembly, and all signa-. 
tories of the treaty. It is. obvious that the Aqthofity must be free to 
operate by majority vote. The General Assembly would be in a 
I;osition to act if a veto threatened in the Security Council. 
The Charter disclaims any tight of the United Nations to inter, 
fere in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
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of any State. Inasmuch as an inspectorate would be required to enter 
and move freely within each nation and report on what it discovered, 
a disarmament treaty would need to provide that these inspection 
activities did not constitute an infringement of domestic jurisdiction 
or it would need to relate this question to Article 2 (7)' and to Chap- 
ter VlI by protocol. Otherwise some change in Article 2 (7) would 
, . * .  ' 
be required. 
Articles of the Charter dealing with representation, member- 
ship, admission of new members, suspension, and expulsion of mem- 
bers would need to be re-examined. Since the disarmament plan 
ought to cover all the nations and since it should be implemented 
through the United Nations, the U.N. should move promptly toward 
universality of membership. This means a new effort to eliminate 
the veto on questions of membership. There should probably be no 
expulsion allowed, although suspension, as envisaged in Article 5, 
might be continued. It is possible that some changes would be re- 
qd,red in Chapter VII of the Charter, in which is defined the role of 
the Security Council in handling threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace, or acts of aggression. Indeed, Article 47 of that Chapter, 
dealing with a Military Staff Committee, is a dead letter at the pres- 
ent time. In Chapter VIII, "Regional Arrangement$' some changes 
in wording might be required to put the Charter in harmony with 
the more important changes in earlier sections. 
I Finally, some Articles of the Charter, such as 53 and 107, should probably be changed to eliminate references to "enemy states," which are put by the original wording of the Charter in a special category. Such provisions would no longer be realistic or necessary if a uni- 
versal disarmament plan were adopted. 
How can the "will to disarmament," essential to carrying any 
program through, be created? We have referred earlier in this back- 
ground study to the pressures growing out of the competition in 
atomic and hydrogen arms. We are now faced with nothing less than 
the question of the survival of the human race. Nor should we forget 
the new schools, the new hospitals, the new homes, the new oppor- 
tunities for producing food and clothing, the better life which 
1 Article 2 (7) states, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
ndm Chapter VZZ." (italics ours) 
could result for us and for dthers the woild over if there were an end 
of the arms race. To threse things we could add the deep satisfaction 
which would rightly be ours from having brought under control 
man's greatest and most impressive problem. 
Summary of Suggestions 
1. Disarmament should be universal. It is essential that any agree- 
ment include all the major powers. It should eventually include all 
countries. This means that at an early date all the major powers 
must be brought into the negotiations and that, at a later stage, 
all countries must participate in the negotiations. 
2. Disarmament should be carried out through the United Nations. 
This would be facilitated if all nations were Members. A new 
effort should thus be made to eliminate the veto as it applies to 
membership. 
3. If agreement on disarmament were reached, an entirely new ad- 
ministrative and supervisory organ would need to be created to 
exercise control over the agreement or the treaty and to administer 
the inspection system. This agency might be called the Disarma- 
ment Authority. It should be an organ of the United Nations. 
4. The Disarmament Authority should report to the Security Council 
and the General Assembly, as well as to all States adhering to the 
treaty. It should be free to make decisions by majority vote. 
5. The international inspection force must have unhindered access to 
all arms-producing facilities and all military staging points. They 
must have complete freedom to report. 
6. The enforcement provisions of the disarmament treaty should be 
based upon prompt judicial review of, and action on, suspected 
violations. 
7. The Charter prohibition against interference in the domestic af- 
fairs of Member States (Article 2 (7)) would need to be qualified 
by amendment, or by having the nations agree in any disarmament 
treaty that inspection and enforcement activities do not constitute 
such "interference," or by special protocol relating the disarma- 
ment agreement to Article 2 (7) and to Chapter VII. 
8. Since provision should be made for the German people and for 
Italy and Japan to attain membership in the U.N. and to be cov- 
ered by the disarmament agreement, Articles 53 and 107 (which 
refer to "enemy states") would need to be amended. 
9. That part of tLe charter which deals with regional arrangements 
(Chapter VIII) would need to be harmonized with any other 
changes made. 
7 .'i - 4 
ARTICLES OF U.N. CHARTER ON 
AMENDMENT PROCEDURE 
Arficle 7 08 
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for 
all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted 
by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly 
and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional proc- 
esses by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including 
all the permanent members of the Security Council. 
Article 7 09 
1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations 
I for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the 
Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have 
one vote in the conference. 
2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a 
two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two- 
thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the 
permanent members of the Security Council. 
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth 
annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into 
force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference 
shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assem- 
bly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote 
of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven 
members of the Security Council. 
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STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE 
COMMITTEE ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
,The American Friends Service Committee wishes to express to the 
United Nations, on the occasion of its Tenth Anniversary, a message of 
gratitude and hope-gratitude for the d r s t  decade of accomplkhments 
and confident hope in its future. 
Even thovgh governments have not yet been willing fully to explore 
its potential for peace, the United Nations is an instrument of great value 
for the settlement of international conflicts. We pledge our cooperation, 
along with others of like mind, to the promotion of peace through the 
United Nations. 
In the joint effort of nations to cope with the basic social and eco- 
nomic problems of the world, the United Nations has made an invaluable 
contribution. We are gratified to have been able to cooperate in its work 
for refugees, in Korean rehabilitation, and in various social and technical 
assistance programs. The Committee will continue to offer its services as 
opportunity affords within the limit of its resources. 
The United Nations offers leadership both to governments and to 
individuals, symbolizing, as it does, the faith of all men in the develop- 
ment of a peaceful and brotherly world community. 
Ado ted by the Executive Bomd 
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